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“Can we be epigenetically proactive?”, is the question asked by Evers in her pa-
per in this collection. After describing an original approach to using insights from
the epigenesis of neural networks to develop new training and treatment pro-
grams, in particular to educate children and adolescents to become less violent
and more sympathetic, the author suggests that there is a naturalistic responsibil-
ity for using science in this manner. In this commentary, I relate her proposal to
the human enhancement debate at large, with a focus on the prevalent concept of
human wellbeing. After a discussion of the factors that account for people’s qual-
ity of life and the role of research that allows them to decide the priorities for a
good life themselves, three caveats against Evers’s approach are presented: (1)
that epigenetic intervention carries the risk of psychological side-effects; (2) that
people’s autonomy must be respected; and (3) that the world’s situation may not
be as bad as suggested by the author when describing the benefits of her pro-
posal. It is therefore concluded that, at least for the time being and until these
challenges are met, we should not be epigenetically proactive.
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1 Introduction
Kathinka Evers this  collection discusses  the
possibility of changing people epigenetically. In
particular, she discusses the option of increasing
sympathy and decreasing xenophobia and viol-
ence.  The term  “epigenetics” is  often used to
describe processes affecting the activity of genes
such as DNA methylation, which might enable
the  inheritance  of  acquired  properties  (Bird
2007). In contrast to this meaning, Evers uses
the term more narrowly, with reference to the
epigenesis of neural networks by selective stabil-
isation of synapses as an essential mechanism of
brain development (Changeux & Danchin 1976).
The idea of affecting people’s development—or
ontogenesis—through this mechanism, in order
to achieve a desired state (e.g., an increase in
sympathy) and/or to avoid an undesired state
(e.g., a decrease in xenophobia or violence) can
then be called epigenetic proactivism.
After describing human beings as social in-
dividualists  and  egocentric  evaluators  predis-
posed for  selective sympathy and xenophobia,
Evers explains neuronal epigenesis in detail. By
influencing synaptic selection, this process may
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critically  affect  social  and  cultural  evolution.
The central brain area for this is, according to
the author, the prefrontal cortex, which is in-
volved  in  planning,  decision-making,  thought,
and  socialisation;  in  particular,  lateral  pre-
frontal areas are associated with behaviour con-
trol. With respect to a task developed to test
prefrontal cortex functioning, namely the Wis-
consin  Card  Sorting  Task  (Dehaene &
Changeux 1991), Evers discusses how neuronal
epigenesis could explain rule-learning and top-
down control. Finally, she devises two examples
—adolescent violence in relation to their social
environments and violence in adults associated
with  interconfessional  conflicts—to  illustrate
what epigenetic proactivism may mean in prac-
tice.  She  eventually  invokes  a  naturalistic  re-
sponsibility to use the respective scientific and
philosophical  knowledge  for  the  benefit  of
ourselves and our societies.
In this commentary, I will start out by re-
lating Evers’s proposal to the  human enhance-
ment debate, which has received much attention
recently—in particular within neuroethics. After
summarising  the  general  assumptions  and
caveats of this debate, I will elaborate on the
definition of people’s wellbeing prevalent in the
discourse on human enhancement and present
an alternative based on social science research.
Finally, I will discuss epigenetic proactiv-
ism,  Evers’s  original  proposal  for  changing
people, in more detail. Arguing that the actual
means—whether  neurobiological,  psychological,
or social—do not matter very much, while is-
sues related to adaptation, autonomy, and in-
strumentalisation  are  of  essential  ethical  and
philosophical relevance, I will emphasise the role
of an individual’s  informed decision. I will dis-
cuss in particular the three theses that (1) their
proposed epigenetic intervention carries the risk
of  psychological  side-effects;  (2)  that  people’s
autonomy must be respected; and (3) that the
world’s situation may not be as bad as sugges-
ted by the authors when describing the benefits
of their proposal. My conclusion will therefore
be  that  the  ethical  justifiability  of  epigenetic
proactivism  critically  depends  on  whether
people can freely choose themselves whether or
not  to  become  epigenetically  proactive,  in  a
situation  sufficiently  free  from social  coercion
and  in  sufficient  awareness  of  the  likely  out-
comes—effects  as  well  as  side-effects—of  that
intervention.
2 The human enhancement debate
In a paper on the “biopolitics” of cognitive en-
hancement,  Peter Reiner recently  referred  to
Plato’s Phaedros, where Socrates discusses what
we nowadays might call the psychological side-
effects  of  writing,  namely  the  risk  that  our
memory  skills  will  deteriorate  when  we  rely
more on written texts (2013). Interestingly, So-
crates’s concerns—voiced some 2400 years ago—
seem to be confirmed by recent experiments in-
dicating that people are less likely to remember
information when they expect it to be easily ac-
cessible with the aid of computers (Sparrow et
al. 2011). It goes without saying that everything
we do has some psychological or neural impact,
whether transient or permanent. However, writ-
ing—and,  more  recently,  digital  information
processing—can  be  seen  as  an  enhancement
technology, as it enables asynchronous and dis-
tant  communication  with  contemporaries  as
well as saving thoughts and ideas for the future.
We  should  keep  in  mind,  though,  that
the very notion of  cognitive enhancement was
introduced only recently into the scholarly de-
bate  and  its  increasing  prevalence  coincided
with the institutionalisation of neuroethics in
the early 2000s (Figure 1). In the meantime,
some authors criticised the exaggerated prom-
ises of the debate, pointing out misperceptions
in the assessment of pharmacological enhance-
ment behaviour, the complexity of the brain’s
neurotransmitter systems, and the insufficient
success  of  the  much  larger  bio-psychiatric
paradigm of improving psychological function-
ing in those looking for treatment (Lucke et
al. 2011;  Quednow 2010;  Schleim 2014a). The
latter means that even when the aims of the
intervention  are  clearly  circumscribed—e.g.,
decreasing the severity of the symptoms char-
acteristic  of  a  disorder—and  research  funds
are abundant, bio-psychiatric research has un-
fortunately not been as successful as expected.
This may relativise the hopes for effective bio-
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psychological  enhancement  in  the  healthy  in
the near future.
Figure  1:  Publications  on  enhancement.  Publication
data from the ISI Web of Science show a steep increase in
publications  covering  “cognitive  enhancement”  (blue)
that coincides with the institutionalisation of neuroethics
(Farah 2012).  “Mood”  or  “affective  enhancement”  (or-
ange)  and  “neuroenhancement”  (yellow)  are  addressed
much less frequently, although these topics also are in-
creasingly discussed. (ISI Web of Science Topic Search)
While  describing  writing  as  a  means  of
cognitive  enhancement  may seem plausible  at
first glance, it also carries the risk of neglecting
several distinctions that may be ethically and
socially important. Such distinctions are, for ex-
ample, those between learning the use of an in-
strument to achieve a certain aim and oneself
becoming an instrument for the aims of others;
between using an external device and directly
interfering  in  the body;  and between defining
ends  autonomously  and being  adapted  to an-
other’s ends heteronomously. Distinctions in ac-
tual cases will not always be clear and often fall
into a grey zone, but this does not mean that
possible  interventions  cannot  be  discussed
against  these  concepts.  These  may  be  under-
stood as marking the ends of a spectrum: for
example, from full autonomy to full heteronomy.
Indeed, while some scholars frame the consump-
tion  of  stimulus  drugs  such  as  amphetamine,
methylphenidate,  or  modafinil  by  students  as
individual choices for better cognitive function-
ing (Greely et al. 2008), that is, in an autonom-
ous  fashion,  several  results  suggest  that  stu-
dents might rather respond to the demands of a
competitive  academic  environment,  and  thus
heteronomously. I will argue later that this op-
position  between freedom and coercion  is  the
crucible of ethically assessing epigenetic proact-
ivism.
There is  already empirical  evidence from
representative  surveys  or  interviews  with  stu-
dents that emphasises the relevance of this dis-
tinction.  For  example,  M. Elizabeth Smith &
Martha Farah describe in their extensive review
on  “smart  pills”  that  the  largest  nationwide
study  identified  admissions  criteria  (competit-
iveness) as well as two other social factors as
the strongest predictors of stimulant drug con-
sumption  (2011).  Interviews  with  non-medical
consumers of stimulant drugs at an “elite” col-
lege carried out by  Scott Vrecko suggest that
people use stimulants for emotional and motiva-
tional ends rather than for cognitive enhance-
ment, in particular to increase motivation to be-
gin with or to complete boring tasks (2013). Fi-
nally, reviewing forty studies on public attitudes
toward pharmacological cognitive enhancement,
Kimberly J. Schelle and colleagues found that
coercion  to  use  drugs  is  a  consistently  men-
tioned concern (Schelle et al. 2014). This evid-
ence associates the availability of enhancements
like stimulant drugs with the pressure to adapt
people to given standards of performance. Yet
in the scientific literature the notion of cognitive
enhancement is much more prevalent than the
emotional  and motivational  aspects  frequently
mentioned in practical contexts (Figure 1).
Scientists  and  policy-makers  in  the  UK
Foresight Project on Mental Capital and Well-
being note that globalisation increases demands
for competitiveness as well as the pressures in
our  working  lives  (Beddington et  al. 2008;
Foresight Project 2008). They conclude that in
a  rapidly  changing  world  like  ours,  we  must
make the most of all our resources in order to
keep up with competitors; whole countries have
to  capitalise  on  their  citizens’  cognitive  re-
sources. To achieve this aim, John Beddington
and colleagues see vast possibilities in improving
a country’s “mental capital” for all members of
the population. They identify the possibility to
do so at each stage in life,  such as the early
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identification  and  treatment  of  people  with
learning difficulties or the governmental support
of those who want to work longer—though, not-
ably, not shorter. A failure to react in a timely
way to the challenges would come at a high cost
for society, while early intervention in education
could improve productivity at work and avoid
costs related to a loss of mental capital (Bed-
dington et al. 2008).
This  view  on  performance  enhancement
for individual and social welfare reflects the fo-
cus of influential papers in neuroethics, emphas-
ising  the  potential  improvement  of  attention,
memory, or wakefulness through the consump-
tion  of  stimulant  drugs  or  other  pharmacolo-
gical substances and neuroscientific technologies
affecting the nervous system (Farah et al. 2004;
Greely et al. 2008). Assumptions regarding the
possible  benefits  of  such  substances  are  fre-
quently based on trials employing test designs
from  clinical  psychology,  developed to identify
and  trace  impairment  in  psycho-behavioural
functioning,  whether  the  investigated  sample
consists of patient populations, healthy people,
or both (Bagot & Kaminer 2014; Repantis et al.
2010; Smith & Farah 2011). 
Even if such test designs are of high clin-
ical value, it is much less clear what statistic-
ally significant, yet often subtle, improvements
in  such  experimental  tasks,  for  example,  in
planning or memory games, mean for the  liv-
ing environment of the healthy. Whether such
improvements  indeed  translate  into  an  in-
crease  in  individual  wellbeing  or  the  mental
capital of  a nation has yet to be shown. In-
deed it is not even clear what a reliable and
ecologically valid way of answering this ques-
tion would look like. While this is still quite
challenging after much debate on pharmacolo-
gical  enhancement,  it  is  presently  even  less
clear what such a standard could look like for
epigenetic proactivism. In addition to measur-
ing the benefits, neuroscientists frequently ad-
dress  the  possibility  of  a  psycho-behavioural
trade-off—that  is,  the  risk  that  an  improve-
ment in one domain would come at a loss in
others  (Brem et  al. 2014;  Hills &  Hertwig
2011;  Quednow 2010;  Wood 2014).  Given
these complexities in the empirical research on
enhancement,  it  will  be  helpful  to  introduce
an explicit definition for further discussion.
Human Enhancement =Df A change in the
biology or  psychology of  a  person which
increases the chances of leading a good life
in the relevant set of circumstances.
Notice how this definition, proposed by Julian
Savulescu and colleagues in the introduction to
a recent edited volume on human enhancement
(Savulescu et al. 2011), relates the good life of
an individual—its biology or psychology—to the
context in which that individual  lives:  human
enhancement  is  something  done  to  or  with  a
particular  person  in  a  fixed  set  of  circum-
stances, namely, a change in her or his biology
or psychology. This choice already predisposes
the debate and research on enhancement with
respect to adapting an individual to her or his
environment.
To provide an illustrative and provocative
counterexample: under this definition the “treat-
ment” of a homosexual suffering from social ex-
clusion by instigating heterosexual acts and rela-
tions, as was routinely performed by clinical psy-
chologists and psychiatrists until the 1970s (Bar-
low 1973;  Hinrichsen &  Katahn 1975),  would
qualify as a form of human enhancement—inas-
much as it succeeds in “helping” the subject to
avoid the undesired sexual behaviour that instig-
ates social exclusion and the suffering probably
caused by it. With respect to this historical ex-
ample we already know that leading psychiatrists
later acknowledged that there was nothing inher-
ently  wrong with  homosexuals,  but  that  their
suffering indeed originated from social exclusion;
this reasoning eventually lead to the decision not
to consider homosexuality a mental disorder any
longer (Friedman et al. 1976). It is instructive to
contrast  the  definition  proposed  by  Savulescu
and colleagues with the following inverted altern-
ative.
Human  Enhancement-Inverted  =Df A
change in the relevant set of circumstances
that increases the chances of a person to
lead  a  good life  according  to  her  or  his
preferences.
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This alternative is not meant to be a logical in-
version, but instead switches the levels of inter-
vention,  of  that  which  is  malleable  and  that
which is considered as given. In an experimental
fashion, one could also say that it is about a
switch of dependent and independent variables,
from the individual to its life context. Yet the
aim of the intervention remains unchanged: in-
creasing the chances of leading a good life. It
goes without saying that both definitions, when
put into practice, are constrained by available
means and ethical principles, for example also
requiring that we take the likelihood of other
people’s chances of leading a good life into ac-
count. It is not necessary here to argue that the
inverted definition is better than the original;
my intention is  merely to show that we need
not  focus  on  bio-psychological  changes  alone.
Instead, we can target the social context as well,
decreasing the risk of adapting people to a so-
cial standard. Please note that this in itself does
not  imply  a  normative  judgment,  but  rather
widens the perspective for further analysis  by
taking  alternative  levels  of  intervention  into
consideration. As mentioned before, the balance
between freedom and coercion,  and autonomy
and heteronomy will be essential with respect to
epigenetic proactivism.
Here I have described some basic assump-
tions and criticism of the neuroethics debate on
human enhancement, including the association
of wellbeing with standards developed in clinical
contexts that focus on individuals rather than
on their social contexts. In the next section I
will introduce research aimed at describing and
understanding what people themselves consider
to be quality of life, which poses an alternative
to the standard adapted from clinical psycho-
logy.
3 Who defines wellbeing?
The position  paper  on  cognitive  enhancement
by Henry Greely and colleagues starts out with
the claim that “[s]ociety must respond to the
growing  demand  for  cognitive  enhancement”
(Greely et al. 2008, p. 702). The article by Bed-
dington and colleagues on the mental wealth of
nations  begins  with  the  conclusion  that  “[t]o
prosper  and  flourish  in  a  rapidly  changing
world,  we must  make the most  of  all  our re-
sources—both mental and material” (Bedding-
ton et al. 2008, p. 1057). Both statements are
similar in that they frame recent developments
in such a way that they necessitate a reaction:
we  “must”  respond  in  a  particular  manner.
Greely and colleagues call for a “responsible use
of  cognitive-enhancing  drugs  by  the  healthy”
(Greely et al. 2008, p. 702), though the major-
ity of readers responding to their paper under-
stood them as exaggerating the benefits of drug
use generally or as being financially influenced
by drug companies (Greely 2010). Beddington
and colleagues call for the maximisation of our
resources. All these authors want to increase be-
nefits  and  decrease  harms.  However,  who
defines what counts as a benefit, as wellbeing,
or as a good life? This is an essential and funda-
mental question that will influence every bene-
fit-risk-analysis on human enhancement (Nagel
2014; Schleim 2014b).
As mentioned in the previous section, sev-
eral scholars discuss the potential of means for
enhancement,  particularly  psychopharmacolo-
gical drugs, with respect to studies employing
clinical  test  designs—whether  investigating
healthy people, those with a mental disorder, or
even animals. Such tests measure reaction times
or error rates in tasks requiring, for example,
attention, memory, or planning. That is, the ex-
perimental setting frequently originates from a
pragmatic context guided by identifying, treat-
ing, and/or predicting the development of a cer-
tain  mental  disorder.  The  underlying  mental
disorder concept, which is in itself controversial
and  subject  to  recurrent  modifications,  essen-
tially hinges on a subject’s clinically significant
distress or functional impairment in the domain
of cognition, emotion, and behaviour (American
Psychiatric Association 2013; Stein et al. 2010).
However,  benefit,  wellbeing,  or  a  good life  as
discussed in the debate on human enhancement
at large are not merely the opposites of clinic-
ally  significant  impairment;  a  five  percent  in-
crease,  say,  in  a task where a subject  has to
memorize as many digits as possible, and that
may identify memory problems, does not reflect
an  increased  performance  in  a  real  test,  not
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even  a  maths  exam  at  school  or  university.
Much less is it a suitable indicator of a benefit
for the quality of life, although such a finding
may be sufficient for publication in a peer-re-
viewed pharmacological journal.
However,  there are advanced, direct, and
representative  measures  of  the  quality  of  life.
One example is the United Nations World Hap-
piness Report, which compares the situation in
156 countries.  The variables  GDP per capita,
social support, healthy life expectancy at birth,
freedom to  make  life  choices,  generosity,  and
perceptions  of  corruption  together  explain
75.5%  of  the  international  variance  of  world
happiness  in  2012  (Helliwell et  al. 2013).  A
more recent development is based on the OECD
Guidelines on Measuring Subjective Well-being
(OECD 2013).  These  allow  people  to  create
their own  Better Life Index, prioritising eleven
pre-defined  domains  such  as  education,  jobs,
housing, or safety.
More  than  60,000  citizens  from  OECD
countries  have  so  far  submitted  their  prefer-
ences,  yielding important  regional  differences.1
For example, people from the USA valued hous-
ing (on average 7.8 on a scale up to 10 points)
and  income  (10.0)  the  highest,  but  work–life
balance  comparatively  low (5.3).  By  contrast,
people from Denmark, which is number one in
the World Happiness Report, prioritised work–
life  balance  higher  than  all  others  (9.8),  and
also valued life satisfaction (9.4) and community
(10.0) very highly, while considering income less
important (4.0). One may raise the question, of
course, whether such statements are biased by
social  stereotypes  or  social  desirability,  but
what could be a better measure of what people
find  important  for  leading  a  happy  life  than
asking  them  directly?  This  is  particularly  so
when they participate in the survey entirely on
their own account.
These  results  emphasise  two  essential
points for the human enhancement debate: first,
people differ individually as well  as regionally
on what they find important for their wellbeing.
Second, many of these aspects are not directly
based on bio-psychological factors, but on social
1 http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org 
accessed July 18, 2014
factors. Indeed, the OECD construct of subject-
ive wellbeing focuses on income, health status,
social  contact,  employment  status,  personality
type, and culture as determinants of life satis-
faction,  affect,  and eudaimonic wellbeing.  Un-
like clinical measures of psycho-behavioural per-
formance, they do not primarily rely on func-
tional impairment.
Most  importantly,  the  Better  Life  Index
allows people to indicate themselves what they
find  important  for  their  subjective  wellbeing;
and it turns out that many of these aspects, like
housing or safety, are actual social factors that
can only very indirectly be targeted by bio-psy-
chological  intervention.  Therefore  it  becomes
clear that a biased or narrowed concept of hu-
man enhancement carries the risk of missing the
point  of  what  determines  or  enables  a  better
life.  Further  systematic  analysis  beyond  the
scope of this paper is required to show whether
the factors identified are more amenable to indi-
vidual  psychobiological  intervention,  such  as
targeted by Savulescu and coleagues (Savulescu
et  al. 2011),  or  socio-political  initiatives.  Yet,
while Greely and colleagues or Beddington and
colleagues merely assume that increased cognit-
ive performance will increase people’s quality of
life (Beddington et al. 2008; Greely et al. 2008),
an initiative like the OECD Better Life Index
allows  people  to  autonomously  express  their
own views on the issue and thus provides robust
empirical evidence. This strategy helps to avoid
two normative fallacies:  first,  that a parental-
istic decision is possible when it comes to what
should be good for others and, second, the idea
that just because some intervention leads to a
higher test score it is therefore good.
This  section  has  highlighted,  again,  the
tension between individual  freedom and social
adaptation, between autonomy and heteronomy.
While  most  scholars  would  emphasise  that
people should be free to choose for themselves,
fundamental definitions as well as the framing
of  human  enhancement  can  implicitly  narrow
freedom, for example by introducing a limited
standard for quality of life or by constraining
the target for intervention. That is, when people
apparently  have  free  choice,  because  they  are
asked to choose from a number of alternatives
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that choice may actually be quite limited, be-
cause the offered options neglect important al-
ternatives.
As described in the previous section, people
are well aware of the threat of coercion when dis-
cussing the prospects of enhancement. Coercion
does not only exist at gunpoint, when acting un-
der duress in a strong legal sense, but it can also
come in a much less direct manner: For example,
by telling people that they  must choose from a
limited set of options, because otherwise some-
thing bad is going to happen. Referring to what,
putatively,  many  people  are  already  doing  or
what globalisation requires increases the pressure
on individuals.  There are meaningful and evid-
ence-based alternative views on human enhance-
ment,  beyond  those  focusing  on  functional
impairment, as shown in this section. In the next
section, I will focus on the epigenetic proactivism
proposed by Kathinka Evers in more detail.
4 Epigenetic proactivism
Evers starts out their description of the natural-
istic responsibility to become epigenetically pro-
active with a reference to the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights. She criticises that, under-
stood as a description of the present world, it is
false to assume that all humans are born free and
equal in dignity and rights; and if we understood
this as a normative ideal, it would be unrealistic
to guarantee these rights for every human being,
given our present cerebral structure. In contrast
to  the  human rights  ideal,  many people  suffer
from poverty and insufficient health care, and live
through serious  conflicts.  Most  people  lack the
sympathy necessary to respect the rights of others
and all humans exhibit some kind of xenophobia.
In the end, Evers even refers to the idea that hu-
mans might be subject to some built-in error or
deficiency,  predisposing  us  to  self-destruction.
Against this background, she proposes her epigen-
etic proactivism as follows:
Synaptic  epigenetic  theories  of  cultural
and social imprinting on our brain archi-
tecture open the door to being epigenetic-
ally proactive, which means that we may
culturally influence our brain organisation
in the aim of self-improvement, individu-
ally as well as socially and change our bio-
logical  predispositions  by  a  better  fit  of
our brain to cultures and social structures.
(Evers this collection, p. 12)
She  discusses  two  examples  in  more  detail,
namely violence in adolescents and violent inter-
confessional conflicts. Referring to neurodevelop-
mental  research  on  children  and  teenagers’
brains,  she  suggests  that  different  educational
measures  such  as  physical  exercises,  cultural
games, and new therapies amount to a kind of
proactive  epigenetic  imprinting  that  increases
control of aggression, emotion regulation, sym-
pathy, and tolerance. It would be largely a mat-
ter of political will and social agreement, Evers
claims,  to  develop  the  research  enabling  such
educational programs and to apply them in prac-
tice. If successful, epigenetic proactivism would
make societies more peaceful and inclusive, but
the author also points to a problematic circular-
ity, namely that we perhaps first need to live in
an  already  peaceful  society  in  order  to  enact
such educational programs to maintain peace.
If  we  had  to  choose  between  epigenetic
proactivism and the destruction of humankind,
the decision would probably be easy; and the
humbler  prospect  of  avoiding  adolescent  viol-
ence  and  interconfessional  conflicts  also  has
some seductive allure. However, for three reas-
ons I hesitate to agree with the conclusion that
we have a naturalistic responsibility to improve
ourselves  epigenetically,  assuming  that  science
will develop enough at some point and offer the
novel educational measures suggested by Evers:
first, decreasing the disposition towards aggress-
ive  behaviour  and  increasing  sympathy  might
have  unexpected  psychological  side-effects;
second, the value of human autonomy has to be
considered by epigenetic proactivists,  too; and
third, the human condition might not be as bad
as  the  author  describes.  I  will  discuss  these
three caveats in the following sections.
4.1 Side-effects of epigenetic proactivism
At first glance, who would disagree that a world
with less aggression and more sympathy would
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be a better world? If we could indeed decrease
adolescent  and  interconfessional  violence,  why
shouldn’t we put such an educational program
into action? Evers refers to Darwin and evolu-
tion several times in her paper. Consequently,
this biological framing also raises the question
of the possible evolutionary value of aggression
and  violence  (Eibleibesfeldt 1977;  Smith &
Harper 1988). Darwin’s original idea of the sur-
vival of the fittest emphasises the very notion of
securing access to scarce resources—often at the
cost of other living beings, which may even lead
to the extinction of a whole species. It may well
be that aggression is an essential driver of evol-
utionary development.
It goes without saying that from the fact
that  something  leads  to an  increased  survival
value it does not follow that it is morally good.
But it is clear that, even from a social perspect-
ive, aggression might have a function, or might
be necessary for achieving some desirable ends.
In  the  famous  novel  A Clockwork  Orange by
Anthony  Burgess,  we  learn  about  a  fictional
case where a cruel and ruthless juvenile delin-
quent—Alex—is successfully treated bio-psycho-
logically to stop being violent.  This is carried
out  in  a  pharmacologically  enhanced  operant
conditioning program that associates scenes of
violence  with  aversive  stimuli,  such  that  the
former delinquent feels severe nausea whenever
he is confronted with aggression, including as-
saults against himself. This has the side effect
that  after  the  treatment  Alex  cannot  defend
himself  anymore  and  he  therefore  becomes  a
victim of severe humiliation.
While  this  example is  different  from the
case  of  interconfessional  violence  discussed  by
Evers, it is directly related to her other example
of violence in adolescents. It is a complex bio-
psychological  question whether  negative  facets
of aggression can be extinguished without also
affecting people’s capacity for self-defence. The
author is  aware of  the problem of  circularity,
that a world may first have to become peaceful
for epigenetic proactivism to be successful—and
the present caveat emphasises this dilemma: if
only some people were educated to avoid viol-
ence and conflicts, this could easily be abused
by others.
How  about  increasing  sympathy,  then?
Evers is critical about the fact that people are
xenophobic and restrict their sympathy to small
groups, while they should ideally extend it to
human society at large. As disappointing as it
may be from an ethical point of view, it could
well be that a distinction between one’s own or
one’s group’s welfare from that of others is es-
sential  for psychological wellbeing.  A dysfunc-
tional self–other distinction, drawing a clear line
between oneself and others, may play a role in
schizophrenia  (Decety &  Sommerville 2003;
Jardri et al. 2011). Furthermore, several invest-
igations reported an association between emo-
tional empathy and depression or decreased life-
satisfaction (Gawronski & Privette 1997; Lee et
al. 2001; O’Connor et al. 2002).
These  links  with  mental  health  may  be
speculative to some extent, yet they illustrate
that even a  prima facie positive capacity may
become negative when increased too much. Ac-
cordingly,  it  has  become  common  wisdom
within psychopharmacology that there is an op-
timal level of neurotransmitter concentration in
the brain and that both a decrease and an in-
crease may be dysfunctional and/or lead to un-
expected side-effects (Wood et al. 2014). Even if
ethicists,  in  line  with  Evers,  presented  strong
arguments in favour of considering the welfare
of those far away from oneself  or one’s group
(Greene 2003;  Sidgwick 1907;  Singer 2002;  Un-
ger 1996), it should be born in mind that an in-
crease of sympathy might lead to a decrease in
subjective wellbeing.
4.2 Human autonomy
The vision  of  a  scientifically  enhanced  world,
where  people  are  better  at  controlling  their
emotions, particularly aggression and other im-
pulses that might lead to violent behaviour, is a
recurrent topic in the history of science. For ex-
ample, in the 1960s and 1970s, neuroscientists,
psychologists, and sociologists all discussed the
problem  of  delinquency  and  aggression,  also
with respect to adolescents, and proposed differ-
ent solutions for coping with it. The pioneer of
brain stimulation, José Delgado, tested the ef-
fects of electrical inhibition or excitation of dif-
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ferent brain areas associated with emotion pro-
cessing, such as the amygdalae, in several an-
imal  species  as  well  as  in  humans  (Delgado
1965, 1971; Delgado et al. 1968). His discussion
of the social implications of such technology is
surprisingly reminiscent of epigenetic proactiv-
ism:
Understanding  of  biology,  physics,  and
other  sciences  facilitated  the  process  of
ecological liberation and domination. Man
rebelled  from  natural  determination  and
used his intelligence and skills to impose a
human purpose on the development of the
earth. We are now on the verge of a pro-
cess of mental liberation and self-domina-
tion which is a continuation of our evolu-
tion.  Its  experimental  approach  is  based
on the  investigation  of  the  depth of  the
brain  in  behaving  subjects.  Its  practical
applications do not rely on direct cerebral
manipulations  but  on  the  integration  of
neurophysiological and psychological prin-
ciples leading to a more intelligent educa-
tion,  starting  from the  moment  of  birth
and continuing  throughout  life,  with  the
pre-conceived  plan  of  escaping  from  the
blind forces of  chance and of  influencing
cerebral mechanisms and mental structure
in  order  to  create  a  future  man  with
greater personal freedom and originality, a
member of a psychocivilized society, hap-
pier, less destructive, and better balanced
than present man. (Delgado 1971, p. 223;
reference omitted)
He and others (e.g., Mark & Ervin 1970; Valen-
stein 1973)  were  convinced  that  therapeutic
need would drive the development of such neur-
otechnology.  The  envisioned  “psychocivilized”
world would be so beneficial for individuals and
society at large, Delgado believed, that the ad-
vantages  overruled  any  social  and  ethical
caveats (Delgado 1971). At the same time, the
psychologist  Burrhus  Skinner  wrote  a  best-
selling book on his vision of a peaceful society
realised through social engineering and inspired
by  behaviourism  rather  than  neurotechnology
(Skinner 1971).  Through  rewarding  the  right
kind of actions, Skinner suggested, the socially
desired  behaviour  would  become  more  likely,
and the undesired behaviour more unlikely. To
avoid a totalitarian regime, the people subject
to this social engineering should in turn control
the reward structures, the so-called contingen-
cies of a society. Yet, in spite of the book’s pop-
ularity,  it  was  strongly  criticised  by  Noam
Chomsky for confusing science and politics and
for a misapplication of central notions such as
freedom and dignity (1971).
The  two  utopian  proposals  by  Delgado
and Skinner,  the part of the human enhance-
ment debate discussed  above  that  describes a
need for adaptation as without alternative, and
epigenetic  proactivism  have  in  common  that
people should be changed in such a way that
they contribute to a (putatively) desired social
aim: a macroscopic state with better perform-
ance,  competitiveness,  peacefulness,  and/or
caring  for  others.  This  is  in  obvious  conflict
with the notion of autonomy that is so funda-
mental to  Immanuel Kant’s moral  philosophy:
no  human  being  must  be  treated  only  as  a
means to another end; all humans must also be
treated as an ends in themselves (1785/1994).
Given the description of epigenetic proactivism
by Evers, stating that our brains shall fit better
to our cultures and social structures, one may
well ask whether those enhanced in this manner
would  not  become  mere  instruments  for  the
present system, with its social norms and val-
ues.  Also  with  respect  to  John Stuart Mill’s
utilitarian  liberalism,  interventions  to  improve
people seem problematic, as Mill formulated the
principle:
[…] that the sole end for which mankind
are warranted, individually or collectively,
in interfering with the liberty of action of
any  of  their  number,  is  self-protection.
That  the  only  purpose  for  which  power
can be rightfully exercised over any mem-
ber of  a civilised community, against his
will, is to prevent harm to others. His own
good,  either  physical  or  moral,  is  not  a
sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be
compelled to do or forbear because it will
be better for him to do so, because it will
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make him happier,  because, in  the opin-
ions of others, to do so would be wise, or
even right. These are good reasons for re-
monstrating with him, or reasoning with
him, or persuading him, or entreating him,
but not for compelling him, or visiting him
with any evil in case he do otherwise. […]
Over  himself,  over  his  own  body  and
mind,  the  individual  is  sovereign.
(1859/1989, pp. 17–18)
Interestingly, Mill explicitly formulated the ex-
ception of self-protection and harm to others, to
which Evers refers in her paper as well. How-
ever,  I  doubt  that  epigenetic  proactivists  can
base their ethical justification on this case, as
the harm they want to avoid is very indirectly
related to intervention—which will most likely
be applied to many people who would not have
posed  a  threat  to  others  without  it.  Further-
more,  it  can  be  doubted  how  imminent  the
danger is at all; this last point will be elabor-
ated in the next subsection. Although other and
more recent versions of “utilitarianism”, such as
preference utilitarianism, place less emphasis on
autonomy than Kant or Mill, they also lend the
inner core of a person, for example, her or his
preferences and values, a status of special pro-
tection (Singer 2011). This core is likely to be
affected by changing people’s predisposition to
aggression and sympathy, as the brief descrip-
tion of psychological side-effects in the previous
subsection suggests.
Therefore,  the  essential  question  for  epi-
genetic proactivism seems to be whether people
can autonomously consent to the intervention.
Evers’s title asks whether we can be epigenetic-
ally proactive; I have reformulated this to ask
whether we  should be epigenetically proactive.
Here it is particularly relevant that her two ex-
amples,  adolescent  and  interconfessional  viol-
ence, explicitly address the development of chil-
dren  and  teenager’s  brains—that  is,  people
whom we do not usually consider to be (fully)
autonomous.  The question of  whether parents
can  take  this  decision,  aimed at  rewiring  the
nervous  system  of  their  children  for  a  social
aim, is too complex to be discussed here, but it
calls for a solution before we can really think
about putting epigenetic proactivism into prac-
tice. 
For our present purposes it shall suffice to
suggest that it is unlikely that all parents would
consent to such a measure.  What would then
happen to those who declined to participate in
epigenetically  proactive  educational  programs?
Even today, some families resist education be-
cause they see a conflict  between their values
and teaching on, for example, sex education or
evolutionary  theory.  In  particular,  those  who
benefit from the present social order would be
unlikely  to  consent  to  a  measure  that  might
lead to a loss of power for them. As mentioned
earlier, this may make those who are made less
aggressive and more empathic more likely to be
exploited by those who are not. Therefore, it is
an essential challenge for epigenetic proactivism
to  take  autonomy,  informed  consent,  and  the
further complexities of intervening in the core of
a person’s personality into account—and to con-
sider that people’s views on these issues will be
diverse!
Until these challenges of autonomy and in-
formed consent in particular are met, I draw the
tentative conclusion that we should not be epi-
genetically  proactive.  It  should  be  noted,
though, that while I am discussing the proposal
by Evers here, the argument from autonomy is
independent of the means actually used to en-
hance people—whether biological, psychological,
or social. Rather, it is essential that people are
free from coercion and can decide for themselves
whether or not they want to become the kind of
human being envisioned by proponents in the
human enhancement debate, and that they have
sufficient knowledge on the implications of that
choice.  Evers  particularly  focusses  on children
and  adolescents  when  discussing  examples  of
epigenetic  proactivism,  but  it  appears  to  be
most difficult to describe what autonomous and
informed choice means in precisely this group of
human beings.
4.3 The human condition
Evers emphasises that many people live in pre-
carious  circumstances,  even  more  than  sixty
years after the Universal Declaration of Human
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Rights;  in  the end, she even refers  to Arthur
Koestler’s  idea that humans might have some
built-in  deficiency,  predisposing  us  to  self-de-
struction. Obviously, against that prospect, the
promises of epigenetic proactivism look seduct-
ive.  Indeed,  we must  concede that even some
twenty-five  years  after  the  Cold  War interna-
tional conflicts have not abated altogether—in
some areas they have even multiplied, and ter-
rorism or economic instability are a concern for
many. However, from the perspective of cultural
evolution, universal human rights are a rather
novel development and it may be too early to
take a pessimistic stance on their success and
effect.  Returning to the UN World Happiness
Report  (Helliwell et  al. 2013),  one  may  ask
whether  the  difference  between  the  leading
countries—Denmark,  Norway,  Switzerland,  the
Netherlands, and Sweden (ranked 1st to 5th)—,
those  in  the  middle—Libya,  Bahrain,
Montenegro, Pakistan, and Nigeria (ranked 78th
to 82nd)—, and those at the bottom—Rwanda,
Burundi, the Central African Republic, Benin,
and Togo (ranked 152nd to 156th)—can be ex-
plained or even overcome by means of human
enhancement like epigenetic proactivism rather
than internationally-aided institutional develop-
ment.
One shared rhetorical feature of those vis-
ions of a better humankind is a claim that all
has somehow gone wrong, and even to predict
an imminent catastrophe. For example, the vari-
ous  Humanist Manifestos of the 20th and early
21st century described serious threats to human
survival.2 Delgado emphasized  an  imbalance
between  our  material  and  mental  evolution,
putting humanity  at  risk (1971),  and  Skinner
started out by referring to problems related to
population  growth,  pollution  of  the  environ-
ment,  and nuclear  armament  (1971).  It  prob-
ably lies in the eye of the beholder to speculate
whether humankind has not yet destroyed itself
because or in spite of unprecedented technolo-
gical powers.
It is a matter of fact that we have not yet
done so, and although many things have gone
2 See the three Manifestos of 1933, 1973, and 2003 of the American
Humanist Association on  http://americanhumanist.org/Humanism/
(accessed July 21 2014).
wrong, others have gone right. Steven Pinker re-
cently gathered evidence that, particularly when
viewed in relation to the vast population growth
of humanity, our present times are much more
peaceful than the past (2011). He describes pro-
cesses of pacification and civilization as well as
a humanitarian and rights revolution that can
provide  hope  that  things  will  change  for  the
better, not only for the worse. Therefore, even if
human  enhancement  in  general  or  epigenetic
proactivism in particular may offer genuine im-
provement  of  the  human condition  in  several
ways, they are probably not necessary for hu-
man survival.
5 Conclusion
Kathinka Evers summarises research on the epi-
genesis of neural networks to describe a vision
of  epigenetical  proactivism,  a  development  of
new training and therapeutic programs to im-
prove humans. She asks whether we can be epi-
genetically proactive, pointing out the benefits
of decreasing the prevalence of adolescent and
interconfessional violence, and in so doing devel-
ops her answer: yes, in principle, we can be epi-
genetically  proactive.  However,  she  also  de-
scribes a naturalistic responsibility to do this,
which is the point at which my discussion of her
proposal  diverged  from her  view.  Particularly
with  respect  to  autonomy  and  free  choice  I
think that, for the time being, we should not be
epigenetically proactive; and we should be even
more cautious when interventions in children’s
and  teenagers’  brains  are  at  issue.  Minor
caveats are related to the possible psychological
side-effects of decreasing our disposition towards
aggression and increasing that of sympathy, as
well as a more optimistic view of how human-
kind is developing.
In this paper, I also related epigenetic pro-
activism  to  the  human  enhancement  debate
more generally,  which has become much more
comprehensive than can be addressed in such a
brief commentary. It was important to examine
the definition of wellbeing and the framing of
urgency, as well as the primary level of interven-
tion—bio-psychological  or  social—, issues  that
are  also  related  to  autonomy.  This  does  not
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mean that knowledge on epigenetics could not
be used in another manner for the purposes of
enhancement,  in  situations  where  people  can
make  an  informed  decision  for  themselves
whether and how to engage in a certain kind of
training. In this sense, it would be interesting to
compare  epigenetic  proactivism  to  other  non-
pharmaceutical means of enhancement, such as
nutrition, exercise, sleep, or meditation (Dresler
et al. 2013). Generally speaking, the knowledge
described by Evers could also be related to de-
bates on improving school education neuroscien-
tifically (Hook &  Farah 2013;  Posner &  Roth-
bart 2005). Furthermore, when targeting human
capacities that are also salient for moral cogni-
tion, the debate on moral enhancement may be
an important reference point with overlapping
prospects  and  concerns  (Douglas 2008,  2013;
Harris 2011).
Evers  warned  that  science  has  been  hi-
jacked repeatedly throughout history and that
in particular the dream of creating perfect hu-
man beings  has  a  sordid past.  Here  I  whole-
heartedly agree with her and her related call for
historic awareness. I hope that I have succeeded
in  showing  why,  beyond  this  awareness,  it  is
also  essential  to  take  people’s  own views and
autonomy into account. It may not only be the
case that too much focus on enhancing people
makes them sad by focusing too much on their
deficiencies  (Schleim 2014b;  Schopenhauer
1874), but in the attempt to create superhuman
beings a human catastrophe might also be pro-
voked.
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